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Abstract 
From 1953 to 1960, the federal government terminated sovereign recognition for 109 American In-
dian nations. Termination was a haphazard policy of assimilation that had disastrous consequences 
for Indian land and culture. Nonetheless, termination cloaked latent motivations for Indian land 
within individual rights rhetoric that was at odds with Indian sovereignty. Termination highlights 
the rhetorical features of social control under capitalism portrayed in George Orwell’s Nineteen 
Eighty-Four (1949), in which opposing principles are fused and inverted. This essay critiques termi-
nation’s Orwellian language to show how ideographs of social liberation are refashioned by the state 
to subvert Indian sovereignty and popular dissent. 
 
Keywords: American Indians, Arthur V. Watkins, Orwellian language, termination 
 
On August 1, 1953, Congress approved House Resolution 108, terminating the federal gov-
ernment’s recognition of sovereignty for five of the largest American Indian nations, the 
Flathead, Klamath, Menominee, Pottowatomie, and Turtle Mountain Chippewa (Wil-
kinson, 2005, p. 57). Announced as the new direction of Indian affairs, termination signaled 
the decline of New Deal enthusiasm for tribal sovereignty. From 1953 to 1960, Utah Senator 
Arthur V. Watkins and Bureau of Indian Affairs (BIA) Commissioner Dillon S. Myer, with 
Congressional support, reoriented federal Indian policy to align with Cold War ideologies 
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of national unity, anticommunism, and cultural homogeneity. Termination disbanded fed-
erally recognized tribes, removed their tax exemptions, ended federal assistance, and ex-
tinguished fishing and hunting rights. Nonetheless, Watkins and Myer insisted that 
termination was in American Indians’ best interests. They spoke euphemistically of termi-
nation as an Indian freedom program that would emancipate tribes from paternalism, cre-
ate formal equality, facilitate self-reliance, and bestow Indians with citizenship. 
Despite Watkins and Myer’s bold claims, termination reversed decades of policies that 
enabled tribes to recover millions of acres of land. Fixico (1986) argues that “termination 
threatened the very core of the American Indian existence—its culture” (p. 183). Termina-
tion contributed to a decline in funds for health, education, employment, and resource 
management. Fixico concludes that during the termination era “the government processed 
109 cases of termination affecting 1,369,000 acres of Indian land and an estimated 12,000 
Indians” (p. 183). By individualizing ownership, termination opened tribal lands and as-
sets to private sale and commercial development, frequently against the expressed interest 
of the tribe in question. 
In this essay, I examine how Watkins and Myer successfully defined termination—a 
policy inimical to tribal sovereignty—as American Indian liberation. They used terms con-
noting individual rights such as freedom and equality to redefine assimilation as an ethical 
duty. Such rhetoric mystified the ways in which termination served the economic free-
doms of non-Indians interested in exploiting tribal lands. Watkins and Myer’s rhetoric 
demonstrates the recurring failure of individual rights rhetoric to facilitate American In-
dian self-determination. They inverted historic Indian demands to escape paternalism into 
an antithetical argument for assimilation into mainstream society. Termination rhetoric 
garnered strong support because it accessed ideological narratives of American democracy 
rooted in liberal capitalism. In this assessment, I am guided by Koppes’s (1977) insight that 
“in formulating policy for native American societies, mainstream Americans often reveal 
not so much their concern for Indian realities as their image of what society at large should 
be” (p. 544). 
In the policy rhetoric of termination, Indians were not removed but liberated from their 
reservations; not deprived of federal protection but unburdened from paternalism. Reserva-
tions were not homelands but prisons. These discourses exhibit the rhetorical features of 
social control that unfold in George Orwell’s Nineteen Eighty-Four (1949), a vision of a dys-
topian society governed by a corrupt language of inverted and unified opposites in which 
“war is peace, freedom is slavery, ignorance is strength” (p. 10). Further, because termina-
tion rhetoric unified emancipatory terms with oppositional meanings, it functioned like 
Orwellian Newspeak. Revisiting the insights of Orwell on language and his theorization 
by Herbert Marcuse (1964), I advance an Orwellian critique of political language to expose 
how capitalist interests are sustained by unifying opposed principles. Orwell and Marcuse 
can guide critics interested in demystifying discourses that consolidate power under the 
banner of social liberation. Focusing on the exemplary case of termination, this analysis 
animates the workings of Orwellian language, its potentially dangerous consequences, and 
alternatives for resistance. 
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The Critique of One-Dimensional Language 
 
In Nineteen Eighty-Four, the official language of Newspeak replaced Old English with the 
aim of liquidating subversive thought. Freedom, peace, and equality were redefined as 
their opposites and emblematized in the state party slogan: “War is Peace.” The unification 
of opposites negated the antiauthoritarian language of protest. Orwell (1949) wrote that 
“the special function of certain Newspeak words, of which oldthink was one, was not so 
much to express meanings as to destroy them” (p. 311). Newspeak inoculated its authori-
tarian purveyors against discourses of dissent and laid siege to oppositional reasoning by 
promoting doublethink, a cognitive practice of reconciling contradictory ideas through the 
manipulation of language. Orwell’s concern with the corruption of language and its fusion 
with repressive state functions directed social theorists to examine discourse as a construc-
tive feature, rather than representative element, of totalitarian society (Orwell, 1946). John 
Rodden (2003) writes that for Orwell, “The corruption of language . . . could fatally under-
mine freedom and open the door to tyranny” (p. 21). 
Though this allegory provided a poignant critique of Soviet communism, Orwell ex-
plained how linguistic mystification was fashioned as a method of social control in the 
West. A devout Democratic Socialist, Orwell did not intend Nineteen Eighty-Four to defend 
freedom as defined under Western capitalism (Hitchens, 2002; Kellner, 1984). Herbert Mar-
cuse (1964) explains the significance of Orwellian thought for critical theory: 
 
The fact that the prevailing mode of freedom is servitude, and that the prevailing 
mode of equality is superimposed inequality is barred from expression by the 
closed definition of these concepts in terms of the powers which shape the re-
spective universe of discourse. The result is the familiar Orwellian language 
(“peace is war,” and “war is peace,” etc.), which is by no means that of terroristic 
totalitarianism only. (pp. 88–89) 
 
Marcuse directed Orwell’s critique toward the parallel rise of new forms of social re-
pression in the West, observing that capitalist societies stabilized themselves through inte-
grated consumption and production of false needs and the advancement of technological 
control. In such societies “the very mechanism which ties the individual to his society has 
changed, and social control is anchored in the new needs which it has produced” (1964, p. 9). 
He used Orwellian language to describe how the key terms of social liberation generally 
associated with class struggle become unified with their opposites to nullify critical 
thought. In Douglas Kellner’s (1984) words Orwellian language “smooth[s] over social 
contradictions and problems, and thus restricts thought and public discourse to the terms 
and interests of the established society” (p. 258). 
Marcuse’s critique unmasks the discursive practices that obscure exploitation and erode 
critical reasoning faculties (Bonefeld, 2001; Horkheimer, 1992; Marx, 1867/1983, p. 77). 
With rationalizations superimposed over social contradictions, Marcuse (1964) argues that 
reason under capitalism assumes the primordial properties from which it proclaims to ascend: 
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Today, the mystifying elements are mastered and employed in productive pub-
licity, propaganda, and politics. Magic, witchcraft, and ecstatic surrender are 
practiced in the daily routine of the home, the shop, and the office and the ra-
tional accomplishments conceal the irrationality of the whole. (p. 190) 
 
The unification of opposites conflates reason with reality, name with function, and es-
sence with existence. Kellner (1984) writes that “reason has identified itself with the reality: 
what is actual is reasonable, although what is reasonable has not yet become reality” (p. 231). 
This shift in the locus of mystification is an ideological iteration of postindustrial rational-
ity in which “the rational rather than the irrational becomes the most effective vehicle of 
mystification” (p. 189). 
Marcuse’s turn to Orwell was motivated by two concerns. The first was his “repressive 
tolerance” thesis which held that the state and capital maintained power through permit-
ting dissent while employing discursive cooptation strategies (Marcuse, 1969). The second 
is one shared by rhetorical theorists: the tendency of political vocabularies to malfunction. 
Burke (1969, 1959) observed the atrophy of reason through casuistic stretching, a mode of 
argument employed to resolve moral concerns by applying abstract principles to specific 
cases. Casuistry is moral reasoning abstracted from historical analogies followed by gen-
eralized maxims for situated moral decision-making (Jonsen & Toulmin, 1988, p. 257). 
Wright (2006) argues that casuistic stretching can impoverish analogical reasoning through 
“the deliberate bending of an argument’s topic and scope” (p. 55). Like Marcuse, Burke 
(1984) suggests that argument by analogy can erode disparate categories of reasoning 
through rationalization: “The breakdown in our categories of the ‘proper’ is now so thor-
ough that this transplantation of words into ‘inappropriate’ settings is constantly with us” 
(p. 109). In what Marcuse calls one-dimensional language, analogical reasoning concerning 
the situated application of principles such as liberty and equality are invoked ad nauseam 
without reflection on their polyvalent historical meaning. 
McGee (1980) argues that part of the problem is that rhetorical situations are never per-
fectly similar. Ideographs, or politically resonant “ordinary language term[s] found in po-
litical discourse,” are employed to establish connections between diachronic and 
synchronic contexts (p. 15). Ideographs such as equality acquire meaning through appli-
cation to their comparatively appropriate present-day usages. Analogies can malfunction 
to the extent that rhetors overlook disparate contextual meanings. McGee notes that “such 
instances have the potential to change the structure of ideographs and hence the ‘present’ 
ideology” (p. 14). Inconsistent usages of ideographs distort historical precedent and flatten 
diachronic meanings to justify antithetical courses of action. In such cases, liberal ideo-
graphs can be employed to conflate diachronic with synchronic meanings, transforming 
the term’s historic connotations. Aune (1994) suggests that Marcuse was similarly con-
cerned with both the failure of political vocabularies and the functionalization of language, 
“the tendency to substitute signal responses to language for critical thought” (p. 83). This 
mirrors McGee’s observation that political slogans can be “easily mistaken for the technical 
terminology of political philosophy” (p. 5). Further, by structuring society’s ideological 
commitments, ideographs can produce deferential responses to reiterated political language. 
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Concerned with deceptive political vocabularies, some critics have employed ap-
proaches that can be characterized as demystification (Aune, 1999; Cloud, 2003; Edelman, 
1977, 2001; Pei, 1973; Schiappa, 1989), a Marxist strategy of uncovering false consciousness, 
or a social superstructure imposed over an unequal base that conceals the exploitative con-
ditions of production (Foulkes, 1983). Applied to the ideological function of language, 
McGee (1982, 1984) and Wander (1983, 1984) contend that discourse serves agents of social 
and economic power. Critics, thus, should fashion their interpretative capacities to under-
stand, in Cloud’s (1994) words “how political and economic power is mediated, reinforced, 
perpetuated, and challenged in the texts we study” (p. 143). Here I am less concerned with 
relative truth or falsity of termination rhetoric than its plausibility, or fidelity to capitalist 
ideology. I am guided by McGee’s (1980) proposition that political languages are not “im-
portant because of their fiction . . . but because of their truth, their links with the trick-of-
the-mind that deludes individuals into believing that they ‘think’ with/for/through a social 
organism” (p. 15). 
Cloud (2003) provides a foundation for criticism of one-dimensional language, arguing 
that “the left must use the resources of demystification—which means countering emotion 
with reason—in the process of building a counter-hegemonic movement” (para. 15). Cloud 
elaborates further: 
 
Deliberation includes the capacity to seek out and entertain multiple positions 
on a given event, the capacity to historicize events, the capacity to weigh com-
peting evidence and reasoning and discard the less credible, the capacity to 
probe the motivation of discourses and adhere to those with the fewest privately 
motivated sponsors, and the capacity to take action based on this deliberative 
process. (para. 37) 
 
The goal, then, of demystification is to introduce multidimensional thought against the 
unification of opposites, or otherwise deceptive political vocabularies. Advancing Cloud’s 
argument, I argue that critics must also counter rationalization with reason. Demystification 
demands the reintroduction of rejoinder and reciprocity into dominant discourse, holding 
abridged, contradictory language to the light of critical reason. 
Marcuse and Orwell offer a supplemental critical language. As Aune (1994) notes, rhet-
oric theorists would glean insights from Marcuse’s contribution; however, “it has been in-
sufficiently acknowledged that Marcuse is preeminently a philosopher of communication” 
(p. 76). Turning to Orwell, Marcuse sought to emancipate discourse from instrumental ra-
tionality. Combining theory and practice, Marcuse (1972) defends “the emancipation of 
consciousness,” arguing that “without it all emancipation of the senses, all radical activism, 
remains blind, self-defeating. Political practice still depends on theory . . . on Reason” (p. 
131). Concerned with the relationship between discourse and economic oppression, Mar-
cuse’s critique of Orwellian language emphasizes the social power of signifying practice 
while also foregrounding the primacy of materialist interests in sustaining and challenging 
social domination (Best & Kellner, 1991). Further, since both Marcuse and Orwell theorized 
the communication practices governing capitalism during the Cold War, the conditions 
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through which their critical insights emerged aligned with the context in which termina-
tion gained favor. 
 
Termination’s Contexts 
 
Termination garnered support by accessing Cold War discourses emphasizing cultural ho-
mogeneity and individualism in contradistinction to Soviet communism (Philip, 2005; Ros-
ier, 2006). Metcalf (2002) argues that termination was a “type of ideological combat,” which 
even for those who defended the welfare of tribes, “devolved into a struggle over land and 
resources” (p. 3). To connect their objectives to national unity and American capitalism, 
terminationists employed liberal ideographs of freedom, equality, and self-reliance. These 
terms evoked nationalist pride in democracy and emphasized the absence of those values 
in Soviet communism. More broadly, termination rhetoric was situated within the Ameri-
can liberal tradition, in which freedoms were derived from a Lockean notion of property 
and labor. 
 
Cold War Anti-Communism 
Anti-Communism made assimilation a necessary goal for Indian affairs. Under John Col-
lier (1933–1945), the BIA had supported policies that preserved tribal self-governance. In 
1934, Congress passed the Indian Reorganization Act (IRA), which prohibited individual-
ized allotment of tribal lands, established procedures for adjudicating federal land claims, 
and established tribal constitutions (Nagel, 1996). Prior to the IRA, Indian policy was gov-
erned by assimilationist impulses reflected by the policy of allotment. The Dawes Act 
(1887) divided reservations into individual holdings under the assumption that private 
ownership would encourage agricultural cultivation and Euro-American lifestyles (Debo, 
1984; Marks, 1998, pp. 216–220). Despite treaty guarantees, allotment resulted in the loss 
of nearly 90 million acres of tribal lands by 1934 (Wilkinson, 2005, p. 43). With Collier’s 
support, the IRA gave tribes a legal mechanism to recover lands lost through allotment. 
Communal land ownership became a concern when Indian administrators felt pressure 
to align Indian policy with Cold War imperatives. A New Deal supporter, Collier was ac-
cused of being a Communist by members of the Senate Committee on Indian Affairs for 
supporting tribal sovereignty (Finger, 1993, pp. 89–90). Collier’s exit from the BIA and the 
rise of anticommunism shifted the priorities of Indian affairs toward assimilation. Senator 
Joseph McCarthy’s paranoid inquisitions from 1949 to 1954 promoted suspicion of Com-
munist influence in American government and, consequently, distorted how New Deal 
programs were portrayed. Whitfield (1996) argues: 
 
The Cold War put the reformist strategies of the New Deal and the Fair Deal on 
ice, as though those experiments were part of the continuum that stretched all 
the way to Moscow. From the perspective of a resurgent right, the regulation of 
capitalist abuses that Roosevelt had begun easily shaded into something more 
sinister. (p. 19) 
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Programs promoting cultural pluralism or restraining capitalism were viewed with sus-
picion. Related, the 1952 McCarran-Walter Act called for exclusion of foreign aliens with 
beliefs or ties to communism, socialism, and anarchism (Wilkinson, 2005, p. 64). Edward 
Lazarus (1999) identifies synergy between the nativist sentiment expressed in McCarran-
Walter and the rise of proassimilation forces. Anticommunists and nativists shared a com-
mitment to national unity, expressed strong antipathy toward otherness, and were suspi-
cious of deviations from the mainstream. 
President Truman’s appointment of Dillon S. Myer as BIA commissioner in 1950 se-
cured the defeat of Collier’s principles. Possessing no direct experience in Indian affairs, 
Myer’s credentials included directing the War Relocation Authority, responsible for ad-
ministrating Japanese internment during World War II. A vocal supporter of assimilation, 
Myer was one of the architects of termination. Drinnon (1987) argues that Myer was an 
unapologetic nationalist and a cold-hearted bureaucrat, his career reaching “out laterally 
to become an expression of Western racism, nationalism, imperialism, and colonialism and 
in that global context added confirmation of Hannah Arendt’s insights into ‘the banality 
of evil’” (p. xxviii). Influenced by Protestantism, Myer embraced the cultural melting pot 
and firmly opposed cultural pluralism (Philip, 1989). In office, he designed urban reloca-
tion programs and encouraged White adoption of Indian children. Postwar changes in BIA 
policy made Myer’s efforts relatively easy. In 1947, Assistant BIA Commissioner William 
T. Zimmerman Jr. compiled a report known as the Doomsday Book, categorizing the tribes 
that were most prepared for assimilation. Fortunate Eagle (2002) observes that in 1952 the 
Department of Interior compiled a 1,800-page document that calculated the expense of 
maintaining federal protections and determined that “twenty-three western tribes con-
trolled a third of the nation’s low-sulfur coal, fully 80 percent of the country’s uranium 
reserves, and from 3 to 10 percent of national reserves in gas and petroleum” (p. 17). They 
calculated that termination would be a cost-efficient way to develop tribal natural re-
sources (Churchill & LaDuke, 1992; Fixico, 1998; Weyler, 1984). 
Termination also complemented prevailing paradigms of minority rights. Cold warriors 
were wary that indigenous self-determination and decolonization had the potential to de-
stabilize the capitalist order. African Americans’ civil rights, however, advanced during 
the termination decade, including the landmark Brown v. Board of Education decision in 
1954, in large measure because desegregation converged with the ideological interests of 
Cold warriors in enhancing the American image abroad (Bell, 1980; Dudziak, 1988, 2002; 
Wilson, 2004). This integrationist approach confused assimilation and detribalization with 
desegregation. Differences mattered, as Deloria (1969) argues, because where they system-
atically segregated African Americans, Whites had “force-fed the Indian what he was deny-
ing the black” (p. 173). Unlike desegregation, however, American Indian sovereignty was 
confused with divisive cultural separatism. 
 
Lockean Individualism 
The extension of freedom and equality was enabled by each term’s historic connection to 
private property. John Locke (1689/1965) argued that civil society was organized around 
the maximization of property. As owners of their labor power, Locke reasoned that indi-
viduals could claim ownership over that which one transformed in the natural world. Life, 
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liberty, and estate were natural rights guaranteed by the social contract between individ-
uals and government. Locke’s philosophy was embraced by American colonists as a ra-
tionale for both revolution and dispossession of Indian lands. Hall (2003) observes that 
because of his Eurocentric view of property “Locke’s Two Treatises have been among the 
most influential texts ever written to provide legal or moral justifications for the dispos-
session and genocide of Indigenous peoples” (p. 185). Whereas European political philos-
ophers such as Jean-Jacques Rousseau viewed property as the root of social inequality, 
early Americans enthusiastically adopted Locke because his theories were “well suited to 
empire” (Engels, 2005, p. 360). 
Locke’s concept of property buttressed the European doctrine of discovery, which guar-
anteed in customary law that land claims in the Americas were property of discovering 
nations. The doctrine advanced the notion that Indian lands were vacant, awaiting to be 
subdued by European settlement (Deloria, 1985). From tribal perspectives, lands consid-
ered vacant to American colonists were fully cultivated. Marks (1998) contends that Indian 
land ownership was “the right simply to use its resources by hunting, gathering, and plant-
ing using nonintrusive methods” (xxii). Hall (2003) notes that Euro-Americans ignored un-
obtrusive forms of Indian horticulture (p. 184). Myths that Indians lacked any concept of 
ownership were not verifiable political facts but rationalizations for dispossession. 
Freedom in principle often meant the pursuit of a Eurocentric concept of private prop-
erty in practice. The natural rights vocabulary contracted to individualist connotations of 
property at odds with Indian sovereignty. The diachronic meaning of freedom as property 
explains how termination proponents were able to contort natural rights as a justification 
for replacing communal ownership with privatized allotments. Lockean notions of free-
dom were the engines of liberal capitalism, emphasizing the accumulation of wealth and 
the expansion of private enterprise; however, for Locke’s contemporaries such as Rous-
seau, and later Marx, Fredrick Engels, Louis Henry Morgan, and Native intellectuals Jo-
seph Brant and Tecumseh, freedom was maximized by transcending private property and 
its byproducts of inequality. Thus, dormant Lockean individualism buttressed non-Indian 
rationales for expropriating tribal lands. 
 
The Orwellian Language of Termination 
 
In the remainder of this essay, I critique three phrasing strategies employed by Watkins 
and Myer that demonstrate the features of Orwellian language: termination as emancipa-
tion, termination as self-reliance, and reservations as prisons. To sketch what I call termi-
nation rhetoric, I focus on the policy’s architects: Watkins and Myer. Both individuals 
devoted large portions of their political careers to termination, led Congressional hearings, 
and wrote the foundational articles that justified termination to policy makers. Through-
out, I provide examples where other policy makers adopted their vocabulary. Though it is 
beyond the scope of this essay to examine all 109 termination cases, the generic features of 
termination rhetoric can be extrapolated from the arguments circulated by Watkins and 
Myers. I examine portions of their writing and testimony in defense of the termination 
cases initiated by H.R. 108 to demonstrate the application of their rhetorical principles in 
practice. 
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Termination as Emancipation 
Terminationists made painstaking efforts to convince policy makers that assimilation was 
a policy of liberation. To accomplish this, H.Res. 108 was framed by natural rights language: 
 
Whereas it is the policy of Congress, as rapidly as possible, to make the Indians 
within the territorial limits of the United States subject to the same laws and en-
titled to the same privileges and responsibilities as are applicable to other citizens 
of the United States, to end their status as wards of the United States, and to grant 
them all of the rights and prerogatives pertaining to American citizenship. 
(H.Res. 108, 1953) 
 
Associating termination with words such as freedom, emancipation, and liberation, ter-
minationists redefined assimilation as the fulfillment of a Native civil rights agenda and 
thus, an ethical obligation. As termination gained momentum, many couched their efforts 
in the language of liberalism. Former commissioner Zimmerman (1957) evoked the lan-
guage of equality and citizenship to defend termination: “Indians should be subjected as 
rapidly as possible to the same laws and entitled to the same privileges and responsibilities 
as other American citizens” (p. 40). Similarly, Montana Senator George Malone (1949) as-
serted the natural rights argument for citizenship because Indians were “born of the fact 
that they do not have equal opportunities and privileges, as compared to other American 
citizens” (as cited in Fixico, 1986, p. 54). 
There were no more fervent defenders of termination than Watkins and Myer. Watkins 
(1957) wrote that the aim of termination was to create “equality before the law” and that 
“our course should rightly be no other” (p. 55). Arguing he was duty bound, Watkins as-
serted that “firm and constant consideration for those of Indian ancestry should lead us all 
to work diligently and carefully for the full realization of their national citizenship with all 
other Americans” (p. 55). The ethical obligation to assimilate Indians relied on a spurious 
analogy to African American civil rights, leading Watkins to frequently conflate desegre-
gation with Indian self-determination. Myer also compared termination to desegregation 
when he wrote, “I believe that we should move as fast as possible toward assisting the 
Indians in the country to become integrated into the general pattern rather than being 
maintained in segregated groups” (as cited in Wilson, 1950, p. 99). Summoning the Four-
teenth Amendment to his cause, Myer (1953) argued that the “constitution provides that 
‘all persons born or naturalized in the United States . . . are citizens of the United States,’” 
thus, “not only are Indians today American citizens; they are citizens of the several states” 
(p. 193). 
Note that throughout the 1950s, civil rights activism was predominantly integrationist, 
directed at eliminating formal segregation and public discrimination in schools, housing, 
transportation, and the military (Dierenfield, 2008). Prior to the direct action tactics of the 
1960s, the prevailing ideology of racial justice was, in the words of Condit and Lucaites 
(1993), based on “Integrated Equality that included political equality, equality of economic 
opportunity, and integrated public facilities” (p. 167). Replacing separate but equal, racial 
justice evolved throughout the postwar period to include a “mathematical proportion as a 
test of equality” based on the assumption that “although there might be important cultural 
K E L L Y ,  W E S T E R N  J O U R N A L  O F  C O M M U N I C A T I O N  7 4  (2 0 1 0)  
10 
differences, similarity outweighed difference” (p. 168). Drawing from the rhetoric of de-
segregation, Watkins (1957) conflated Indian emancipation with equal access to public 
goods: 
 
Virtually since the first decade of our national life the Indian, as tribesman and 
individual, was accorded a status apart. Now, however, we think constructively 
and affirmatively of the Indian as a fellow American. We seek to assure that in 
health, education, welfare, in social, political, economic, and cultural oppor-
tunity, he or she stands as one with us in the enjoyment and responsibilities of 
our national citizenship. (p. 47) 
 
Here, Watkins positioned termination within integrationist logics of minority rights, as-
suming that like African Americans, the Indian’s “status apart” was to blame for inequality 
and that desegregation would provide desired access to public institutions. Thus, Indian 
self-determination was redefined within the context of citizenship not inherent tribal sov-
ereignty. The problem with “Indian wardship,” he argued, was that it privileged race over 
citizenship, “treating the Indian of today as an Indian, rather than as a fellow American 
citizen” (p 48). Watkins then pursued misguided, color-blind forms of racial equality. 
His analogy did not end with the civil rights movement. He aligned termination with 
the abolition of slavery and H.Res. 108 with Abraham Lincoln’s Emancipation Proclamation. 
Comparing himself to a modern-day Lincoln, Watkins (1957) wrote of termination: “Fol-
lowing in the footsteps of the Emancipation Proclamation ninety-four years ago, I see the 
following words emblazoned in letters of fire above the heads of the Indians—THESE 
PEOPLE SHALL BE FREE!” (p. 55). Here, Watkins aligned himself with an entire history 
of racial struggle. An expression of hubris, Watkins’s alignment with 19th- and 20th-century 
civil rights advocacy also inoculated termination proponents against suggestions that they 
possessed self-interested motives concerning tribal resources. Termination was constructed 
as an ethical obligation to enfranchise Indians despite the political costs. A red herring 
fallacy par excellence, his comparison drew attention to the ethical and emotive principles 
of equality at work in the struggle for African American civil rights, overlooking the fun-
damental differences between the two. 
Watkins’s casuistic reasoning transferred to federal warship the ethical principle that 
would motivate a rejection of slavery. Veiled comparisons between wardship and slavery 
were, however, dangerous. Explaining the costs of conflating desegregation with Indian 
self-determination, Deloria (1969) argues that in such arguments “the white man presented 
the problem of each group in contradictory ways so that neither black nor Indian could 
understand exactly where the problem existed or how to solve it” (p. 173). In an effort to 
transfer the conventionally affective responses toward abolition and desegregation to ter-
mination, Watkins’s analogy did a disservice to both. He used casuistry to stand in the 
place of sound reasoning, and, in the process, undermined a clear analytical assessment of 
the disparate causes of Indian oppression. 
To dispel comparisons between termination and previous legislation dispossessing 
tribal lands, Watkins (1957) asserted that federal Indian policy had always been guided by 
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ethical principles: “Historically . . . the Congress, although perhaps more or less ineffec-
tively until recent years, has sought in the nineteenth and early twentieth century to free 
the Indian. A full study of Congressional actions will bear this out. Freedom for the Indian 
was the goal then; it is the goal now” (p. 48). Watkins suggested that with historical per-
spective, termination would be judged as the apex of a continuous effort to liberate American 
Indians. By suggesting that the goal of federal policy had always been Indian emancipa-
tion, Watkins rewrote the history of removal and dispossession as a series of well-intentioned 
mistakes easily remedied by termination. In fact, he highlighted historical moments in 
which allotment was the federal policy as those in which American Indians were on the 
path to liberation, a claim many tribal leaders would dispute. 
Watkins argued that termination reconnected Indian affairs with its supposed ethical 
foundations, that “in the post-depression years Congress—realizing this change of policy—
sought to return to the historic principles of much earlier decades” (1957, p. 48). Termina-
tion provided the appropriate remedy, serving as the tribal Emancipation Proclamation or 
Brown decision. Watkins suggested that policy makers meditate on the historic significance 
of the moment: 
 
This was a most worthy moment in our history. We should all dwell upon its 
deep meaning. Considering the lengthy span of our Indian relationship, the recency 
of this event is significant. Obviously, such affirmative action for the great ma-
jority of Indians has just begun. (p. 48) 
 
Myer (1953) echoed Watkins by suggesting that termination was “one of the most im-
portant milestones in the history of American Indian affairs,” a “landmark in the history 
of Indian legislation” (p. 193). 
Watkins (1957) dubiously concluded that he was a civil rights leader. He anticipated 
harsh rebuke; however, argued that equality was won only through righteous determina-
tion. Disagreement was inevitable, but “as with any such major social concern, methods 
vary in proposed solutions and emotions sometimes rise as to how the final goal should 
best be reached. A clear understanding of principles and events is necessary” (p. 47). He 
contended that because termination was a moral issue, it transcended political considera-
tions. As a result, any dissent was anti-Indian: 
 
After all, the matter of freeing the Indian from wardship status is not rightfully 
a subject to debate in academic fashion, with facts marshaled here and there to 
be maneuvered and counter-maneuvered in a vast battle of words and ideas. 
Much more I see this as an ideal or universal truth, to which all men subscribe, 
and concerning which they differ only in their opinion as to how the ideal may 
be attained and to what degree and during what period of time. (p. 47) 
 
Placing himself above politics, he expressed disinterest in winning a debate through 
reasoned argument. Instead, he elevated termination to a universal ethical principle. As 
such, he asserted that common ground existed for agreement based on shared ethical in-
vestments in civil rights. Although some opponents may have disagreed with its logistics, 
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they should be moved by their conscience to agree that native enfranchisement was a 
moral imperative. 
Watkins (1957) also inverted arguments concerning corporate exploitation of tribal re-
sources. He suggested that termination would remove special interests from Indian affairs 
and provide for tribal control of natural resources: “Special interests are of course involved 
in other ways; thus commercial companies having specific reservation leases may be re-
luctant to see terminal programs proceed, feeling that their own economic interests may 
be jeopardized” (p. 48). In many cases, however, wardship protected tribal lands from cor-
porate development, particularly in forest conservation, where BIA regulations mandated 
sustainable forestry and curtailed exploitative timber contracts on tribal lands. Under fed-
eral protection, the Klamath tribe sustained nearly 2 million dollars in timber sales prior to 
1950 and the Menominee survived by a thriving sawmill (Fixico, 1986, pp. 116–117). Re-
moving BIA timber restrictions, termination opened forests to individual sale and facili-
tated corporate control of tribal timber. Federal protections contributed to the economic 
autonomy of the Klamath and Menominee, the same evidence marshaled by Watkins to 
support the claim that tribes were ready for termination. 
Watkins insisted that private interests were advanced by keeping Indians as wards “be-
cause a few well-intentioned private organizations repeatedly seek to influence Congress 
to keep the Indian in a restricted status by urging legislation to retain him as an Indian 
ward and as a member of a caste with social status apart from others” (1957, p. 48). Here, 
Watkins presented a glaring contradiction. As the argument proceeded, because wardship 
stunted economic development many tribes were dependent on federal resources. Termi-
nation would enable them to escape paternalism; however, the relative autonomy of tribes 
such as the Klamath and the Menominee demonstrated they had, paradoxically, outgrown 
the need for protection. He portrayed tribes as simultaneously impoverished and autono-
mous. Either way, termination was the answer. To smooth over contradictions, he accused 
opponents of practicing deception and harboring hidden economic motives, arguing that 
“private organizations and serious-minded periodicals have been used as devices propa-
gandizing viewpoints based upon assertions known to Congress to be contrary to the facts 
upon Indian conditions” (p. 48). As the argument went, those who opposed termination 
had something to gain from wardship and because Watkins was driven by lofty principles, 
his motives were beyond reproach. 
 
Termination as Self-Reliance 
Terminationists embraced a religio-capitalist ideology of free labor, reframing their effort 
as advancing what Max Weber (1958) termed the Protestant work ethic. Within this ideol-
ogy, frugal and persistent labor was a virtuous article of faith. In addition to a mathemati-
cal litmus test for Indian equality, terminationists sought to debunk traditional Indian 
values that, in their estimation, encouraged dependence. An expression of bourgeois mo-
rality, Protestant values of thrift and industriousness were the driving force behind the 
private accumulation of wealth. Under capitalism, entrepreneurialism and self-reliance ac-
quire moral and even religious significance. In this regard, Myer’s Protestant influence was 
pronounced. Drinnon (1987) writes that “he was a walking repository of the Puritan vir-
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tues and traditional hostility to the very idea of the survival of separate peoples with sep-
arate cultures” (p. xxviii). Watkins, a devout Mormon, also embraced a religio-capitalist 
work ethic that led them to believe that Indians lacked self-reliance (Peroff, 1982, p. 60). 
Watkins’s Mormon religious beliefs influenced his approach to termination in other ways. 
In the Book of Mormon, Indians were the fallen people of American civilization, their skin 
genetically transmuted by God as punishment for their sins. Doctrine holds that it is a 
Mormon’s duty to restore the Indian’s status in God’s Kingdom. Metcalf (2002) argues that 
for Mormons “to ‘elevate’ Indians means to convert and assimilate them” (p. 13). Fusing 
religious duty with capitalist morality, termination became a moral and economic imperative. 
With references to innate abilities and self-reliance, Watkins expressed a desire to help 
Indians adopt capitalist values. He argued that termination would place Indians in a posi-
tion “where they would actually have had to go to work and to take care of their own 
affairs” (as cited in Wilkinson, 2005, p. 69). Watkins (1957) elaborated: 
 
Self-reliance is basic to the whole Indian-freedom program. Through our national 
historic development the Indian was forced into a dependent position with the 
federal government more and more, as America advanced westward, tending to 
sublimate his natural qualities of self-reliance, course, discipline, resourceful-
ness, confidence, and faith in the future. (p. 51) 
 
Asserting that self-reliance and individualism were immutable human characteristics, 
terminationists naturalized their religio-capitalist work ethic and established it as a pre-
requisite to formal equality. Conversely, terminationists also suggested that the collective 
values of the reservation (communal property, sharing) were by products of a structured 
ideology of dependence. Once paternalism was eliminated, the veil of ignorance would be 
lifted and the distorted and characteristically socialist ideologies of the reservation would 
be demystified. For example, Watkins (1957) argued that relocation programs displayed 
Indians’ innate yet dormant abilities: “Through the Bureau’s relocation program increas-
ing thousands of energetic, healthy, skilled Indians compete successfully in our cities, 
bring their families into new modern homes, and thus in effect remove many conditions 
of their earlier wardship” (p. 49). Presenting capitalist morality as natural, this rhetoric 
constructed Indian cultural values as debilitating false ideologies. Termination established 
both a mathematical and moral litmus test for equality achieved through integration and 
value transformation. 
Terminationists argued that because of structured dependence, Indians could not de-
velop their innate abilities. Concerning Menominee termination, Watkins argued that 
“here we have a group of people who have innate ability just the same as other people, 
when they get stimulated with a little ambition and a little necessity. You know, necessity 
is said to be the mother of invention. It is the spur to drive us to do things we don’t think 
we can’t do” (as cited in Wilkinson, 2005, p. 75). When tribes resisted, he contorted their 
efforts into evidence of their innate abilities. During the Ute termination hearings, Watkins 
retorted: “You have enough judgment and intelligence you think to come here and say ‘no’ 
to us. In effect, you are saying ‘No, we don’t want this.’ Haven’t you got enough courage 
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to say ‘No’ to the fellow who comes along and wants to buy your land?” (as cited in Wil-
kinson, 2005, p. 75). Put differently, if tribes could resist federal dispossession, they could 
resist corporate influence. 
Watkins also argued that federal dependence was undemocratic, “that what the Indian 
really wants; he wants representation without taxation. He can tax all the rest of us and 
vote for people who do tax us; but he doesn’t want to pay taxes himself even though he is 
able to do so” (as cited in Fixico, 1986, p. 105). Elsewhere he argued that Indians “want all 
the benefits of the things we have, highways, schools, hospitals, everything that civiliza-
tion furnishes, but they don’t want to help pay their share of it” (as cited in Wilkinson, 
2005, p. 69). Watkins reframed federal protections as special rights. For Watkins, legal 
equality required the performance of patriotic duties, earned only by the full utilization of 
one’s own innate abilities. In Watkins’s (1957) words, Indians would “at last have full con-
trol of their own affairs and would possess all of the attributes of complete American citi-
zenship” (p. 48). 
Watkins (1957) also redefined existing protection as dispossession. He asserted that by 
returning to pre-Depression policies, termination would bestow tribes with full sover-
eignty. Despite the fact that the IRA provided tribes with recourse in federal courts to ad-
judicate their land claims, he asserted that such protections were against tribal interests. 
Watkins referred to federal protections as restrictions and termination as decontrol: “The 
Indian freedom program will not be accomplished immediately in the case of more large 
and complex situations, but for most tribes it can be numbered in a few years” because, he 
continued, “the careful clarification and protection of rights, these at times serve to make 
the process of decontrol lengthy” (p. 49). Here, he implied that constitutional rights pro-
vided the necessary federal protections. He continued, “One facet of this over-all develop-
ment concerns the freeing of the Indian from special federal restrictions on the property 
and the person of the tribes and their members” (p. 47). The restrictions he spoke of, how-
ever, prohibited allotment. Other restrictions were intended to prohibit exploitative timber 
and mineral contracts. What’s more, by treaty, tribes already possessed sovereign control 
over communally held assets. Wilkinson (2005) argues that “although Watkins repeatedly 
said termination would ‘give’ them their land, the tribes already owned it” (p. 71). Despite 
his promise that termination would give Indians their land, tribes such as the Klamath, 
Menominee, and Ute lost tens of thousands of acres to individual sale. Self-reliance rhetoric 
reinforced the erroneous belief that tribes did not already exercise control over their own 
affairs. 
 
Reservations as Prisons 
Watkins and Myer argued that reservations were prisons that segregated and punished 
Indians as conquered peoples. In an address before the Western Governor’s Conference in 
1952, Myer argued: 
 
Many of these reservations were something akin to large detention camps for a 
period of years when the United States government found that it was cheaper to 
provide rations to Indians than it was to fight them. During this period we had 
practically destroyed the basis of their economy, which, of course, consisted of 
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hunting, fishing, gathering of wild fruits, nuts, and berries, and limited farming 
operations. (as cited in Drinnon, 1987, p. 237) 
 
Drawing from imagery of Jewish detention in Nazi Germany, Myer argued that reser-
vations were temporary camps for detained prisoners of Western conquest. Conversely, 
terminating reservations was morally equivalent to liberating European concentration 
camps. Watkins echoed Myer’s conclusions when he characterized his visit to the Menom-
inee reservation as if it were a gulag, noting the experience was the same “in visiting Eu-
rope, the refugee camps in the Near East” (as cited in Wilkinson, 2005, p. 75). Connecting 
the Indian experience with that of the European detainee, the moral urgency for action was 
fundamentally the same. Hearne (2005) explains that such imagery “led both politicians 
and ordinary citizens to view reservations not as tribal lands but as ‘concentration camps’ 
for temporary detainees, rhetoric drawn from the Jewish experience in Europe” (p. 137). 
Terminationists decontextualized this emotional postwar experience to obfuscate the un-
derlying causes of reservation poverty. 
Terminationists used the geographic distance and stunted reservation economies to bol-
ster their claims. Watkins (1957) wrote that “secluded reservation life is a detriment to the 
Indian, keeping him apart in ways far beyond the purely geographic” (p. 51). Focusing on 
the rural qualities of reservation life, Watkins implied that reservations were prisons that 
segregated Indians and contributed to their ongoing oppression. Myer (1953) presented 
distance and separation as the key markers of detention life and implied that relocation 
was the moral equivalent of liberation. Myer carefully distinguished his relocation pro-
grams from the forceful measures of the past that were, ironically, responsible for Ameri-
can Indians’ remote segregation: 
 
Because of lack of education, lack of communication, language difficulties, and 
limited association with non-Indians, many Indians are afraid of the outside 
world. Also many Indians know that some of their present problems stem from 
the fact that their forefathers were once relocated. In order to do this job, we must 
initiate a large-scale training program. (p. 199) 
 
Myer presents a contradiction in which relocation was both the problem and solution 
to American Indian poverty. The same capitalist drive to assimilate American Indians and 
dispossess them of their vast lands was refashioned as an instrument of emancipation. 
Terminationists linked reservations to Soviet communism. Embry (1956) described res-
ervations as experiments in “forced communism” that kept Indians “economically and so-
cially chained to his reservation” (p. 210). Suggesting that communism and detention were 
the factors contributing to tribal poverty, Embry charged the BIA to “close our concentra-
tion camps . . . The Indian then could take pride not only in being an Indian but in being 
an American” (p. 229). Terminationists blamed reservation poverty on tribal lifestyles in-
stead of assimilative federal policies. They portrayed reservation life as austere, enslaved, 
and communistic. For Watkins and Myer, Indians were prisoners of their communal life-
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style. Further, by aligning termination with the Cold War project of defeating Soviet com-
munism and European fascism, assimilationists framed their cause as a just movement for 
national unity and economic progress. 
 
The Language of Indian Liberation 
 
Blackfoot leader Earl Old Person (1967) wrote, “It is important to note that in our Indian 
language the only translation for termination is to ‘wipe out’ or ‘kill off.’ We have no Indian 
word for termination” (p. 18). Termination was a dangerous euphemism that when taken 
literally meant cultural extinction. The Orwellian language of termination presented con-
fusing analogies, false comparisons, and fallacious racial reasoning. Even a perplexed Pres-
ident Eisenhower (1953), approving legislation transferring tribal criminal jurisdiction to 
state governments (P.L. 280), stated that “although I have grave doubts as to the wisdom 
of certain provisions in H.Res. 1063, I have today signed it because its basic purpose rep-
resents still another step in granting equality to all Indians in our nation” (para. 1). Eisen-
hower questioned the logic of the legislation, yet remained enamored by its lofty principles 
and pathos-laden appeals to equality. 
Many terminated tribes were neither able to deflect commercial pressure to sell nor re-
sist government incentives to withdraw from the tribe in exchange for one-time payments 
for the value of their land. Three of the largest terminated tribes—Klamath, Menominee, 
and Ute—lost nearly half of their tribal members through per capita payment (Fixico, 1986, 
p. 185). Over a hundred other smaller tribes met similar fates (Stefon, 1978). Wilkinson 
(2005) concludes that terminated tribes “found themselves poorer, bereft of health care, 
and suffering a painful psychological loss of community, homeland, and self-identity” (p. 81). 
Many Indian groups were aware of the rhetorical strategies employed by Watkins and 
Myer. The Indian Rights Association (1954) argued that “titles of bills are frequently mis-
leading, so that what a bill might actually do may be entirely different from what its title 
would indicate” (as cited in Embry, 1956, p. 211). During termination hearings in 1954, 
Indian delegations traveled to Washington to protest. Many resisted termination by rede-
fining the federal government’s responsibilities (Marks, 1998, pp. 284–289). Responding to 
Watkins’s claim that the government was tired of being a guardian, Mohawk journalist 
Ernst Benedict argued, “Can an honorable Nation, just because it is tired, shrug off its re-
sponsibilities regardless of the wishes and conditions of the ward?” (as cited in Marks, 
1998, p. 286). Some protestors blamed forced dependence on vacillating government poli-
cies, arguing that termination had misidentified the central problem with paternalism. 
Gordon Keshna (Menominee) argued that “you cannot ask the people to go on their own 
and govern themselves now when for all those years they have not been permitted to do 
anything for themselves” (as cited in Fixico, 1986, pp. 95–96). A representative of the Col-
ville tribe argued that termination was abandonment by another name, that Indians “did 
not want to be wards of the government . . . neither did they want to be flung suddenly 
into the sea of the larger American society” (as cited in Dahl, 1994, p. 42). Protestors refuted 
that Indians needed to be taught self-reliance by having their treaties abdicated. Self-reliance, 
they argued, would be facilitated by devolving control of Indian affairs to tribal govern-
ments, not by disbanding them. 
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American Indians asserted the necessity of land to self-determination and challenged 
the portrayal of their homelands as prisons. A Colville resident argued to the Senate that 
“this land is the most important part of my life and the Indian people that live on it for 
existence and happiness” (as cited in Dahl, 1994, p. 43). In a similar comment, another Col-
ville resident argued, “I can go fishing and hunting when I get hungry, I can cut my own 
wood whenever I run out of wood, sell some” (as cited in Marks, 1998, p. 286). Reservation 
residents argued that the land provided self-reliance. Terminationists, however, revoked 
the treaty-guaranteed fishing and hunting rights that encouraged tribal self-sufficiency. 
They considered those special rights. Contrary to Watkins’s (1957) argument that termina-
tion would not “affect the retention of those cultural and racial qualities which people of 
Indian descent would wish to retain,” traditional reservation residents argued their lands 
were necessary to preserve cultural heritage (p. 48). Deloria (1969) would observe later: 
“No movement can sustain itself, no people can continue, no government can function, 
and no religion can become a reality except it be bound to a land area of its own” (p. 179). 
These arguments did not dissuade Watkins and Myer. Other forms of activism, how-
ever, were successful. One of the ironies of termination, Nagel (1996) argues, was that 
“American Indian mobilization and ethnic renewal arose in part out of the federal pro-
grams designed to terminate the special status of Indian tribes and to absorb Indian people 
into mainstream society” (p. 118). Urban relocation contributed to the rise of pan-Indian 
ethnic identification in the inner city and direct action protests (Johnson, 2007). Coming 
into closer contact in the inner city, Indians developed community organizations to combat 
discrimination and the BIA. Under the slogan of Red Power, new militant forms of activism 
developed, driven by younger radical elements in the inner city. These groups worked 
outside of the conventions of Indian affairs, fashioning direct action strategies to reverse 
the effects of termination. 
The rhetoric of termination demonstrates how emancipating political language can be 
affixed to antithetical goals. Edelman (1974) observes that “when it suits us to see ration-
alization as reason, repression as help, distortion as creation, or the converse of any of 
these, language and mind can smoothly structure each other to do so” (p. 45). In cases in 
which social power is at stake “distortion and misperception are virtually certain to occur” 
(p. 45). Some critics argue that such is the fate of ideographs such as patriotism, security, 
and terrorism in the political vocabulary of the “war on terrorism” (Brock, Huglen, Klumpp, 
& Howell, 2005; Winkler, 2005). For example, the USA Patriot Act, which significantly ex-
panded law enforcement powers to detain individuals without habeas corpus, conduct 
warrantless searches, and engage in domestic surveillance, was justified on the grounds 
that restricting civil liberties actually preserves them. In President Bush’s words, “The Pa-
triot Act hasn’t diminished American liberties. . . . It has helped to defend American liber-
ties” (as cited in Fletcher, 2005, p. A6). Critics have observed similar phenomenon at work 
in discourses concerning anti-immigration (Pineda & Sowards, 2007), the Iraq war (Kellner, 
2007; Stuckey & Ritter, 2007), and criminal justice (McCann, 2007). These critics demon-
strate how political languages are the contested terrain of domination and liberation. 
Similar to termination, the vocabulary of anti-affirmative action and anti–gay rights ad-
vocates assert that legislation to protect historically excluded groups proliferate special 
rights. Neoconservatives mirror termination’s logics: that conferral of federal protections 
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specific to one group victimizes those without the protection and infringe on the rights of 
those who discriminate. They appeal to constrictive, denotative forms of equality that 
measure social justice in a vacuum, without reference to the disparate impact of historic 
discrimination. Omi and Winant (1994) observe that rhetorics of reverse discrimination 
advance anemic connotations of formal equality that are both ahistorical and discriminatory. 
Orwellian language is not unique to the Bush administration and will not wither in the 
future. Orwell (1946) warns that we must be vigilant to resist terminological tyranny, be-
cause “political language—and with variations this is true of all political parties, from Con-
servatives to Anarchists—is designed to make lies sound truthful and murder respectable, 
and to give an appearance of solidity to pure wind” (p. 265). Of course, Orwell and Mar-
cuse have been criticized by some for their pessimistic overdetermination of domination 
(Habermas, 1970; Tomlinson, 2002). Though critical of liberation, Marcuse (1972) attuned 
his theories to analyze the then-existing modes of domination and liberation with an eye 
toward which parts of society could be negated or transformed. Marcuse (1972) leaves 
space for resistance when he argues that “instinctual rebellion will have become a political 
force only when it is accompanied and guided by the rebellion of reason” (p. 131). In-
formed but not overdetermined by structure, he suggests that because reason is an instru-
ment of domination, society can be transformed through communicative practices that 
challenge conditioned thought and behavior (Best & Kellner, 1991, p. 291). Marcuse’s 
(1955) turn to reason emphasized the liberatory potential of those creative, and rhetorical, 
traits that stand in opposition to the objectification of thought (Kellner, 1984, p. 235). Mar-
cuse and Orwell guide critics to defend the vocabulary of liberation against the tyrannical 
influence of economic exploitation. 
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